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Summary. I ran an experiment in order to evaluate the relationship, if any, between power, or the search for power, 
and the degree of altruism. In particular I experimentally tested whether an organization structured in a strictly 
hierarchical way was able to reduce the degree of altruism of a group of experimental subjects. The subjects were 
divided into groups and played a series of dictator and ultimatum games with the members of other groups; for each 
experimental euro that they earned, the experimenter assigned half of it to the group. Two different settings were 
analyzed according to how this group surplus was distributed among group members. In the control setting 
(treatment A) the group surplus was distributed equally among group members, while in the power setting (treatment 
B) there was a ranking of the earnings in the group, and the subject who earned the higher sum was given the power 
to decide the distribution scheme of the group different from her own. It was found that the introduction of a 
hierarchical structure generated a significant decrease in the rate of altruism, measured in terms of the allocation 
given to the receiver in the dictator game. In this case the tournament among group members for leadership and the 
competition for power was a very strong means to induce behaviour more in line with the classical assumption of 
economics. A remarkable gender effect emerges, suggesting that women seem less attracted and trapped by 
competition for power.  
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Introduction 
A world in which agents are heterogeneous and selfish individuals cohabit with other-
regarding ones and in which agents display reciprocative behaviour raises completely new 
problems in the design of an optimal economic policy (Bowles, 2006). Already analyzed has been 
the problem of motivational crowding-out (and crowding in) which emerges when external 
intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different 
conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). As a consequence, agents’ 
behaviour is affected by the rules used to interact with other subjects, and the institutional 
framework in which they are bounded to play significantly shapes their behaviour. The 
institutional setting and the social values systems play a crucial role in supporting and spreading 
certain behaviours among agents. Even in the absence of crowding out/in effects, the institutional 
design would play an important role in shaping individual behaviour by harnessing selfish actions 
and fostering pro-social actions.    
To date, very little attention has been paid to analysing how different institutional 
frameworks and different rules of interactions among agents affect the behaviour of individuals 
and mainly their social preferences. A notable exception is Camerer and Fehr (2006). They 
investigate the conditions under which the canonical model of the Homo Economicus prevail 
even in presence of agents who display social preferences and bounded rationality, and they state 
that the institutional mechanisms which rule the interactions among heterogeneous individuals 
are crucial in explaining when the canonical model is able to affect aggregate behaviour and 
when it is not.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. It intends to verify experimentally whether power, or 
better, the search for power is an intrinsic motivation able to crowd out another intrinsic 
motivation, i.e. altruism, and whether a particular system of rules governing the way in which 
individuals interact with each other is able to affect other-regarding preferences and the aggregate 
behaviour of a group of heterogeneous agents. I defined power in a very strict sense as 
“possession of control, authority, or influence over others” (Merrian-Webstair Dictionary); in our 
framework, it was the power to influence the utility a group of subjects by determining the 
amount of their monetary reward. As far as I know no one has ever addressed this question by 
considering the search for power one of the determinants of agents behaviour. Some interesting 
and recent contributions which analyze a similar although different question, that is the role of 
power and hierarchy in team, confirm that the issue is of interest and deserves more careful 
attention (Heijden, Potters, and Sefton, forthcoming) 
The paper reports the result of an experiment taken at University of Siena and involving 
72 subjects. They were divided into groups and played a series of dictator and ultimatum games 
with the members of other groups; for each experimental euro individual subject earned, the 
experimenter assigned half of it to the group. I differentiated one setting from the other according 
to how the group surplus was distributed among group members. In the control setting (treatment 
A) the group surplus was distributed equally among group members, while in the power setting 
(treatment B) there was a ranking of the earnings in the group, and the subject who had earned 
the largest sum was given the power to decide the distribution scheme of the surplus for a group 
different from his/her own. In other words, in this treatment, individuals may compete to acquire 
power. In addiction, I also run an experiment in which there is no competition for power but the 
group surplus   
In order to plainly discriminate between intrinsic (the desire to acquire power) and the 
extrinsic (the amount of money gained throughout the experimental sessions) motivation, the 
design of the experiment did not allow individuals who has acquired the power, to decide the 
distribution of the surplus of their own group and then to decide the amount of money they 
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receive. The acquisition of power in treatment B did not encompass any personal monetary 
advantage and thus did not modify the opportunity cost of altruism 1.  
I found that the introduction of a hierarchical structure generated a significant decrease in 
the rate of altruism, measured in terms of the allocation given to the receiver in the dictator game. 
In this case the tournament among group members for leadership and the competition for power 
was a strong means to induce behaviour more in line with the classical assumption of economics. 
A remarkable gender effect emerged, suggesting that women are less attracted to and trapped by 
competition for power.  
The Experiment: design and procedure 
The experiment took place at the University of Siena. The participants were 72 
undergraduate students recruited through advertisements asking for participants in a paid 
experiment. The experiment was conducted with double blind anonymity ensured: the choice of 
the subjects could not be observed either by the experimenter or by the other experimental 
subjects.  
I analyzed the behaviour of experimental subjects in two different institutional settings. In 
one of these settings, I sought to replicate the interactions of individuals in a group competing 
with each other to climb the group’s hierarchy, and to obtain the power to decide how the profit 
of a group different from her own was to be divided. Twenty-four students were involved in each 
treatment. 
In both settings players were divided into three groups of six subjects each. They could 
earn money from the two activities in which they were involved. These activities consisted of a 
series of ultimatum games and a series of dictator games. In particular the subjects performed 12 
sequences of activities which always consisted of four actions: an ultimatum game2 as 
proposer/responder, a dictator game3 as proposer, an ultimatum game as responder/proposer  
and another dictator game as proposer. In other words, the experiment was designed so that at the 
end of a sequence of activities, four rounds, a subject had played two ultimatum games, one as 
proposer and one as receiver, and two dictator games as proposer.  
For each sum of experimental money earned by a subject through these two activities, the 
experimenter assigned half to the group to which the individual belonged. This latter amount of 
experimental money constituted the group’s surplus to be distributed. The two treatments differed 
in the way that this surplus was divided among group members. In treatment A (the control 
setting), the profits accumulated by the group were equally divided among the group’s members 
4.  
                                                 
1 However, it cannot be denied that a leader who is not assigned the central role of deciding the 
surplus distribution of his/her own group is a lame duck leader. In popular culture, power and 
wealth are strongly linked and the artificial separation that I have introduced may have weakened 
the idea of power perceived by our experimental subjects. In a companion paper (Bosco and 
Marcheselli, 2006) the case in which the leader has the power to decide the distribution of surplus 
of her own group is analyzed. The two experiments were partially different and therefore the data 
are not directly aggregatable; needlessly to say, in this latter case, quite obviously, the effect on 
altruism was even stronger 
2 The ultimatum game is an experimental game in which the first player, the proposer, proposes 
how to divide a sum of money with the second party. If the second player, the responder, rejects 
this division, neither gets anything. If the second accepts, the first gets her demand and the 
second gets the rest (see Camerer, 2003). 
3 The dictator games is an ultimatum game in which the responder’s ability to reject an offer is 
removed, so that she has a merely passive role 
4 In treatment A2 instead the distribution was randomly chosen. 
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In treatment B (the power setting), the framework was more complex. Firstly, every four 
rounds the subjects in each group were ranked according to their individual profits, and they were 
assigned to a position in the group’s hierarchy according to their rank. There were three different 
positions in the hierarchy (table 1) 5. 
 
Table 1 
Role Profit accumulated in individual activities 
D The player who made the highest profit  
F The two players who made the second and third highest profits  
A The three players who made the smallest amount of profit 
 
The player who took position D then autonomously decided how the accumulated profit 
of a group different from his/her own should be divided among the group members. S/he could 
choose one of the distribution schemes reported in table 2. 
Moreover, s/he could also create his/her own distribution scheme by autonomously 
deciding the proportion of group surplus going to the three positions.6 The redistribution schemes 
varied from a egalitarian distribution (IV) to a distribution in which the player in position D could 
be given the lion’s share (II). 
 
Table 2 
 Share of group profit 
Role I II III IV 
D 45% 100% 60 % 16.6 % 
F 20% 0% 20% 16.6 % 
A 5% 0% 0% 16.6 % 
 
The experiment started with a draw. Each subject took a one Euro coin from a bag (his/her 
participation fee); six of them got a coin issued outside Italy.7 These latter were sent to a different 
computer room (room B), while the others remained in the main computer room (room A). In 
both rooms, the subjects were seated in front of computer screens. The subjects in room B were 
soon informed that they would play an almost passive role in which they merely commented on 
the choices of the subjects in room A. After the experimenter had read out the instructions (see 
appendix A for an English version of the instructions), and had publicly answered some questions 
raised by the subjects, the experiment started. 
Then, with the help of a computer program, the subjects in room A played a series of 
ultimatum and dictator games. They always played ultimatum games with subjects belonging to a 
different group and they never played more than once with the same subject in the same role. 
Moreover they never knew the identity of the subject with whom they were playing. Subjects 
always played dictator games as the proposer, while the role of responder in this game was 
played by subjects in room B (they had no other way to earn money, except for a small 
participation fee), and by a charity organization chosen by the experimental subjects from a list 
provided by the experimenter (specifically, they played 18 times with the charity organization 
                                                 
5 Players were informed of their ranks every two games. 
6 Players could not differentiate among subjects in the same hierarchical position. 
7 Euro coins have one side that is common to all euro countries while the other side is country 
specific. 
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and 6 times with other individuals). 
I chose dictator games because these are best suited to analysis of the degree of altruism 
of individuals. The sum that the proposer assigns to the responder is mainly, if not solely, 
motivated by altruistic reasons, in fact. Two broad classes of altruistic motives have been 
analyzed in the literature. The first is unconditional altruism broadly defined as comprising 
warm-glow altruism (Andreoni, 1989), and various forms of egalitarianism (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Loewenstein et al., 1989). This form of altruism is unconditional since it does not depend 
on the characteristics or intentions of the recipients. The second is reciprocal or conditional 
altruism; in this case, the altruism is conditioned by the behaviour or on the characteristics of the 
other subject.  
I introduced two different kinds of receivers in the dictator game in order to capture these 
two different motives for altruism; when a donor gave to another student, s/he was motivated by 
unconditional altruism since the donation was not conditioned either by a certain behaviour of the 
receiver who did nothing or by particular features of the student that made him/her particularly 
worthy of a donation 8. In this case a donation can be motivated also by preference for equality of 
the donor. On the contrary, the donation made in favour of a charity organization chosen by the 
donor from a list of several charity societies provided by the experimenter, is clearly a form of 
conditional altruism; in this case, the decision is conditioned by the characteristics of the receiver 
and the decision to donate strictly depends on evaluation of the past activities of these 
organizations. In this case the donation can be seen as a result of a reciprocative behaviour since 
the dictator could make a contribution only if s/he trusted the charity organization and expected 
that his/her kind behaviour would be reciprocated by the organization.9 
The main hypothesis that I wanted to test was whether the tournament taking place among 
the group members and the competition for leadership of the group determined any change in the 
rate of individual altruism. If our hypothesis was supported, there would not only be a significant 
decrease in the rate of altruism among individuals in treatment B, but there would also be 
evidence that the difference between the rates of altruism in the two settings increased as the 
experiment proceeded. Another interesting question that I wanted to address was whether the two 
altruistic motivations were affected in the same way.  
I also ran a series of ultimatum games; in this case I were interested in verifying whether 
the hierarchical setting of treatment B modified the behaviour of both proposers as far as the sum 
allocated to the receiver was concerned, and receivers, as far as the rate of rejections of low offers 
was concerned. It was interesting to verify whether the desire to climb the group’s hierarchical 
scale in order to obtain an higher payoff and, more importantly in this case, to acquire the power 
to decide, affected the value of ultimatum offers and the rate of rejection of low offers.  
In each round of the experiment the proposer in both the dictator and ultimatum games 
had an average of 90 experimental euros to be divided with the receiver 10. The conversion rate of 
experimental euros into real euros was set at 0.0025; therefore, about 400 experimental euros 
were necessary to earn a real euro. By the end of the experimental session, each experimental 
subject could have earned up to a maximum of about 20 euros  (plus the 1 euro presentation fee). 
At the end of the experiment, agents in room A had earned on average about 12 euros (about 15 
                                                 
8 Generally a dictator has no reason for considering another student more worthy to receive a 
donation than him/herself. 
9 The definition of reciprocity that I adopt here is that of strong reciprocity (Fehr et al., 2000,. 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Strong reciprocator shows a combination of altruistic rewarding, 
which is a predisposition to reward others (at a cost of oneself) for cooperative, norm-abiding 
behaviour and altruistic punishment, which is a propensity to impose sanctions (at a cost of 
oneself) on others for norm violations (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).  
10 In order to minimize any automatism in the choice the sum assigned to the proposer was half of 
the times 100 experimental euros and half of the times 80 experimental euros.  
5 
 
dollars), ranging from 6 euros to 19 euros.    
Experimental Results 
By the end of the experiment, each of the 18 experimental subject had played 24 dictator 
games, always as the dictator, and 24 ultimatum games, 12 as proponent and 12 as responder,  
and s/he had never played the same game, with the same role, with the same player more than 
once. I therefore had the results of 432 dictator games and 216 ultimatum games. This section 
sets out the main results.  
Dictator games 
The main aggregate results from the dictator games are reported in table 3. In a setting 
characterized by double blind anonymity the mean offer is quite low 11. However, it has been 
shown that the mean allocation increases when the responder is not a physical person but a 
charitable body worthy of a donation 12. In addition, there is also evidence  that when the donor 
can observe the identity of the responder the mean allocation increases even if the choice of the 
proposer is still unobservable by the responder and by the experimenter (see for example, Bohnet 
and Frey, 1999).  
In the control treatment, the mean allocation given to the receiver was about 17%, in line 
with the result obtained in other experiments; in more than 25% of the cases proposers left zero to 
the receiver. Moreover, dictators gave on average slightly more to the charity organization than to 
real subjects. This means that the conditional altruism was a more powerful motive for donation 
than unconditional altruism. This is clearly in line with experimental results in which the role of 
reciprocal altruistic is supported (Fong, 2006).   
 
Table 3 
Offers in dictator games 
 Offer frequencies (percent offered) Mean Median SD 
Treatment 0 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 > 50 disaggregate  total   
charity 17.0 
A (control) 27.5% 20.4% 16.0% 16.4% 5.6% 10.6% 3.5% 
subjects 15.9 
16.7 11.1 17.8 
charity 14.3 
B (power) 33.4% 17.4% 15% 21.1% 9.3% 2.3% 1.6% 
subjects 12.7 
13.7 7.1 15.9 
 
However, our interest was not in the degree of altruism per se, but rather in the change 
caused to the degree of altruism by the settings of treatment B. From this point of view, it seems 
quite evident that the desire to achieve leadership of the group induced players to reduce the sum 
they decided to offer to the other player in the dictator games. Both when the receiver was 
another student and when it was a charity organization, proposers offered less in treatment B than 
they did in treatments A. The number of subjects allocating nothing (33%) or less than eleven per 
cent (51%) to the receiver was somewhat higher in treatment B than in treatment A (27% and 
48% respectively). The mean contribution when subjects were divided into groups but without 
any hierarchical rating and with an automatic and egalitarian rule on splitting the group surplus 
was more than 20% higher than in the case in which there is an hierarchical organization (16.7 
versus 13.7). Since the two distributions of allocations are both highly positively skewed, 
                                                 
11 For example, in Hofman et al. (1994), 70% of the subjects did not give anything and the mean 
allocation was about 10%, significantly less than 20% which is the mean allocation in the 
experiments without double anonymity. See also Camerer, 2003  
12 Eckel and Grossman, 1996, for example, obtained a rather higher allocation mean using the 
Red Cross as responder. 
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comparing medians is almost as informative as comparing means. Of interest is the marked 
difference between the median values: the median in the power setting is more than 50% higher 
in the control treatment. It is also interesting to note that the competition for power has more 
effect on the donation to subjects, unconditional altruism, which is 25% higher in the control 
setting than in power setting; conditional altruism, the donation to charity, is 18% higher in the 
control setting.  
In order to evaluate the statistical significance of the these findings, I employed the Mann-
Whiteny test 13 which evaluated whether two independent samples (groups) come from the same 
population. Results are reported in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Mann-Whitney Test 
 Treatment Median z p 
A control 11.1 All 24 
games B power 7.1 -2.23 0.026 
A control 16.5 First 8 
games B power 14.2 -0.745 0.456 
A control 17.3 Second 16 
games B power 10.1 -3.22 0.001 
 
The first row of the table gives the result of the test when all the periods are considered; it 
is evident that I can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two median 
values and therefore between the two distributions at a significant statistical level (less than 5%). 
Therefore the difference in the behaviour of subjects in the two treatments appears to be 
statistically robust. 
Figure 1 
The meaning and the interest of this result is reinforced when the dynamic behaviour of 
subjects is analyzed. Figure 1 shows the four-period moving average allocation given by the 
proposer to the receiver in each period in the two different settings. It is evident that the 
behaviour subjects progressed very differently in the two settings. While in treatment A the mean 
allocation is almost constant over periods, in treatment B the mean allocation to the receiver 
keeps on decreasing over time. The ratio between the mean allocation in the first and in last 
period is 0.95 in treatment A and 0.51 in treatment B. 
Figure 2 
This conclusion is confirmed by figure 2, in which the number of offers smaller than 2% 
in each period are reported for the two treatments. It appears quite clear that while in the control 
setting, the number of almost completely selfish behaviours does not display any positive trend 
over time, in the other treatments there is a plain tendency for the number of pure selfish 
allocations to increase. Until the fifth period, soon after the second session, the number of pure 
selfish allocations is smaller in treatment B than in treatment A, while thereafter the number of 
very low allocations constantly increases in treatment B, while remaining almost constant in 
treatment A. It is very difficult no to explain this performance with the role played by the 
tournament mechanism, which determined a change in the behaviour of subjects in treatment B.  
Table 4 gives statistical support for this finding. I split all the experiment into two parts, 
the first with the initial 8 dictator games and the second with the remaining 16 dictator games. I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two medians are the same in the two treatments as far as 
the initial part of the experiment is concerned, while this hypothesis is significantly rejected in the 
second part of the experiment. Therefore the behaviour of donors is statically indistinguishable at 
the beginning of the experiment, while it becomes increasingly different as the experiment 
                                                 
13 The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test for assessing whether the medians between 
two samples of observations are the same. The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn 
from a single population, and therefore that the medians are equal 
7 
 
proceeds.  
This evidence warrants further discussion. It provides indirect, yet rather robust, 
confirmation of our hypothesis. At the beginning of the experiment there was no significant 
difference between the two treatments as far as mean allocation was concerned. Interestingly 
enough, in the first period the mean allocation was higher in the power setting than in the control 
setting (22,5% and 17.5% respectively).  It was the tournament for the power that, period after 
period, gave rise to different behaviour among the agents, inducing increasingly selfish behaviour 
and yielding an allocation to the receiver which diminished as the experiment progressed. In 
other words, the endeavor to assume leadership and to acquire the power to decide seemed to be a 
very powerful selfishness-inducing device. 
Other interesting issues can be addressed by disaggregating the previous figures and by 
looking at the individual data. It is apparent that subjects were heterogeneous and behaved very 
differently. There were subjects who left more than 30% to the receiver in both treatments. In a 
certain sense, they can be defined “purely altruistic”. Interestingly,  their number (2) is the same 
in the two treatments. Moreover, also the number of pure selfish individuals, who gave nothing at 
the onset and who kept on giving zero in almost every periods, are roughly the same in the two 
treatments (two subjects in both treatments gave zero more than 20 times out of 24). 
These data suggest an interesting consideration. The change in the framework and the 
introduction of a tournament for power had almost no effect on the behaviour of some agents. 
The power setting, in fact, did not modify the behaviour of a pure altruistic individual, who did 
not assign any positive weight in his/her utility function to power and considered neither the 
behaviour of others nor his/her position in the hierarchical ranking to be important. Obviously, 
neither would a pure selfish individual have modified his/her behaviour because s/he would 
always have behaved so as to maximize his/her material payoff.      
 It is therefore clear that the aggregate outcome was determined by the behavior of 
subjects who were neither purely altruistic nor purely selfish. It is consequently important to 
understand the motivations that prompted the majority of the agents to change their behaviour 
when a tournament for power was introduced. Firstly, it should be noted that the main difference 
between the control and the power treatments was that in the latter the agents could exploit a 
trade-off between altruism and power which was absent in the control treatment; in other words, 
in the power setting agents could trade some altruism, by decreasing the dictator offers, in 
exchange for the chance to climb the power hierarchy, while in the control setting agents could 
trade altruism only for money. Thus, the fact that in the power setting the degree of altruism 
significantly decreased means that some of the agents decided to exchange some altruism for a 
slice of power. In other words, there were agents who were unwilling to trade more altruism, 
measured by the sum of money that they left to someone else, for money but they were keen to 
trade altruism for power. In the control setting this trade-off did not exist, so that agents did not 
have this opportunity. When an agent in the power setting decreased his/her allocation to the 
receiver, s/he knew that his/her reward would be not an extra quantity of money but a chance to 
climb the power ladder and ascend the hierarchy of the organization.  
Another important consideration is that power, as I interpreted it in this experiment, is 
clearly a positional good (see Hirsch, 1976 and Pagano, 1999). Indeed, its inherent characteristic 
is that only the player in position D had the right to decide, that is, possesses power. In the control 
treatment, there was no positional good because agents could not see the ranking of earnings and 
therefore every agent played without knowing their relative position. If some agents had 
preferences not only for their absolute level of well-being, but also for their relative position, they 
would clearly have been affected by the power setting because they had an opportunity to change 
their relative position in the social scale. 
Finally, if the share of subjects who display reciprocative behavior is not negligible, I 
have a powerful device spreading the selfish behavior among agents. Reciprocative agents, in 
fact, will respond to the competitive and less altruistic performance of others by decreasing their 
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own allocations as well. It is worth noting that in this framework reciprocative behaviour is 
slightly different with respect to the standard case: in fact, by decreasing the offer, the dictator 
directly affects the welfare of a third party, the guiltless receiver, not the welfare of the other 
dictator. However, two things should be taken into account here. Firstly, the only way in which 
an agent can punish the selfish player is to become selfish him/herself and compete for 
leadership. Secondly, it appears that the reciprocative agent reacts to the environment: as it grows 
increasingly competitive and tough, the agent is negatively influenced and modifies his/her 
behaviour, becoming less and less altruistic.  
To conclude, I can say that the two treatments deliver very different results in terms of 
proposer allocations. When a hierarchy and a tournament for power are introduced there is an 
evident decrease in the level of  altruism and agents become increasingly selfish.  
This result strongly supports the hypothesis that an individual’s behaviour is significantly 
influenced by the institutional setting in which s/he must take a decision. This may be possible if 
one assumes that individual preferences are not totally exogenous, as economists (but not 
advertising agencies) take for granted, and if one assumes that they are influenced by the 
institutional context or by the choices of other economic subjects, companies or consumers 
(Bowles, 1998). This has an important policy implication, for if social preferences are at least 
partially affected by the institutional framework, it may be desirable to design institutions able to 
enhance social preferences and to discourage egoistic behaviour. 
Treatment A2 
The design of the experiment assures us that the opportunity cost of altruism is the same 
in the two frameworks. However it can be argued that in the power treatment there is more 
uncertainty and therefore in this latter case altruism is a riskier activity than in control setting. 
While subjects in control treatment, in fact, knew with certainty that they would receive one out 
of twelve of what individually earned when the group surplus is redistributed, subjects in power 
treatment did not know with certainty how much they would receive when the redistribution took 
place. In order to rule out the increase in risk and differences in risk preference as possible 
explanation of the decrease in altruism, I arranged a version of the control treatment in which the 
distribution of the group surplus was randomized. Subjects were told that one of the four 
distribution schemes, shown in table 2, was randomly selected and that the group surplus would 
be distributed according to the selected quotas; moreover, each subject was informed of the 
probability that each scheme had to come out (table 5).  The probability was taken from the 
decisions of leaders in power setting: when the leader had chosen a free distributional scheme, it 
was approximated to the closest predetermined pattern.   
 
Table 5 
 Share of group profit 
Role I II III IV 
D 45% 100% 60 % 16.6 % 
F 20% 0% 20% 16.6 % 
A 5% 0% 0% 16.6 % 
Probability 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 
 
Again we employ the Mann-Whitney test to verify whether the introduction of a random 
distribution scheme in the control treatment modifies our result in a significant way. The test 
suggests that there is not any statistically significant difference between the randomized control 
treatment and the control treatment, while there is a significant difference between power setting 
and the randomized control setting. Thanks to this result we can conclude that the result discussed 
in the previous sections was not driven by risk preferences. 
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Table 6 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Treatment Mean Median z p 
A control 16.7 11.1 
B power 11.7 7.1 -2.093 0.026 
A2 
control 
15.2 14.2 
B power 11.7 7.1 
-2.333 0.018 
A control 16.7 11.1 
A2 
control 
15.2 14.2 -0.447 0.001 
Ultimatum game   
This section presents the main results of the ultimatum game. As already noted, the subjects 
played the ultimatum game half of the times as proposers and half of the times as responders, and 
with subjects of a group different from their own. I consequently analyze both their behaviour as 
proposers and their behaviour as responders and evaluate the effect exerted by the two settings on 
their choices. The results reported in the literature are that the modal and median of ultimatum 
offers are usually 40-50 percent and means are 30-40 percent; the literature also shows that while 
offers of 40-50 percent are rarely rejected, offers below 20 percent are rejected most of the time 
(Camerer, 2003). 
I first examine the offers that the proposers made in the first step of the ultimatum game. 
The main figures on offers are reported in table 7. 
This finding shows the introduction of the tournament for power changed the behaviour of 
subjects also when they played the ultimatum game in the proposer’s role. In the power setting 
very low offers (from 0 to 10%) were fewer than the offers in the control setting; moreover, also 
very high offers were notably fewer in the power than in the control setting. In the power setting 
more than 60% of the allocations proposed to the receiver were in the central interval 11-30% . 
 
Table 7 
 
 
Offer frequencies (per cent offered) 
 
Mean Median SD 
Treatment 0-10 11-30 31-40 41-50    
A  (control) 6.5% 46.3% 36.6% 10.6% 29.0 30.0 11.6 
B  (power) 4.2% 61.6% 28.2% 6.0% 27.1 25.0 10.4 
 
This result suggests that agents used a different strategy when they played as proposer in 
the ultimatum games in the two treatments. This becomes much more intelligible if I recall that 
the proposer’s offer in the ultimatum games serves two different purposes. First, it has an 
altruistic component: the desire to leave something for the other player; second, it is also the 
result of a strategic consideration: the desire to reduce the probability of a rejection from the 
responder. The findings on the dictator games suggest quite clearly that the altruistic motivation 
strongly decreased in the power setting, and this result seems to be sustained by the observation 
that, in the ultimatum game, offers greater than 40% (which much more than the others signaled 
altruistic behaviour) were fewer in the power setting than in the control setting. On the other 
hand, it is evident that in the power setting the cost of a rejections was higher for those agents 
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who wanted to climb the hierarchy, so that they increased their offers in order to reduce the risk 
of receiving nothing, which would have thus jeopardized their ranking position.  
Table 8 
Mann-Whitney Test on ultimatum offers 
 Treatment Median z p 
A control 30.0 All 12 games B power 25.0 -1.854 0.064 
  
Some proposers reduced the number of very low offers in order to minimize the risk of 
receiving nothing in the case of rejection, but they also decreased offers of more than a certain 
value (the value that they believed would minimize the risk of rejections) because they became 
less altruistic. Therefore, in the power setting the mean value of allocations decreased because the 
subjects were less altruistic (high offers were fewer) and increased because the agents sought to 
minimize expected rejections. The net effect on the average allocation was negative, that is, the 
mean allocation was higher in the control setting than in the power setting. Further evidence 
which confirms the fact that the allocation decisions were the result of a different behaviour is the 
value of median, which is 20% higher in the power setting. It is clearly the result of a strategy 
pursued to minimize both the sum left to the receiver and the probability of a rejection.  
In order to evaluate the statistical significance of the these findings, I employed the Mann-
Whiteny test, which evaluates whether two independent samples (groups) come from the same 
population. The results are reported in Table 8. It is evident that I can reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between the two median values and therefore between the two 
distributions at an acceptable statistical level (less than 7%).  
Figure 3 
As far as the behaviour of responders is concerned, it is interesting to look at the results 
mainly in terms of the rate of rejections. Figure 3 shows the rate rejections in the two treatments. 
The rate of rejections of low offers (less than 20%) is higher in the power setting than in the 
control setting. This is particularly interesting because one would have expected the opposite to 
occur: that is, a lower rate of rejections in the power setting, where the tournament for power 
would suggest accepting also unfair offers in order to climb the hierarchical ordering and grab a 
piece of power. The best strategy for an agent who cared about monetary payoff but also about 
climbing the hierarchy and obtaining some decision-making power would have been to accept 
more likely low offers. The cost of refusal was no longer just the money lost; there was also an 
indirect cost represented by the risk of losing position in the ranking.  
Even though the subjects were told clearly that they would play ultimatum games only 
with agents belonging to a group different from their own, I cannot completely rule out that their 
behaviour was determined by a misunderstanding of the instructions. They therefore rejected low 
offers in order not to give an advantage to a  potential competitor in the tournament for power. 
However, I prefer an explanation more in line with the discussion conducted when the 
dictator game outcomes were analyzed. The power framework affected the behaviour of most of 
the agents in mainly two ways: firstly, by introducing a “new good”, strictly positional, power 
that could be exchanged for altruism; secondly, by introducing the ranking and the tournament 
for power. This gave rise to a much more competitive and aggressive environment which forced 
those agents who behaved reciprocatively to become more competitive and selfish. In an 
atmosphere in which acquiring power had became important for at least some of the agents, these 
tended to respond to a unfair offer by showing their tough side and rejecting the low offers even 
if this was not the optimal strategy to win the tournament. Moreover, it should be borne in mind 
that, in certain sense, rejecting a very low offer was a demonstration of power as well; therefore, 
the trade-off between altruism and power clearly manifest in the dictator game was much more 
indistinct in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, when the proposer’s offer was low enough, the 
material advantage of accepting it was negligible even considering its effect on ranking. Lastly, 
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since the decision to reject was also motivated by the desire to punish who offered too less, in the 
setting in which there was a tournament for power the possible damage was higher than in control 
setting; having an offer rejected, in fact, could jeopardize the proposer’s chance of climbing the 
hierarchical scale in his/her group.  
  Figure 3 also shows that the rate of rejections is lower in the power setting when the 
proposer’s offer is higher than 20 %. In this case the rejection is more costly both in terms of 
money and in terms of the chance to climb the hierarchical scale of the group. Interestingly 
enough, in this case the results match the expectations: in the power treatment, the rate of 
rejections of high offers are less than in the control treatment.    
Leader’s decision 
Every four rounds, the agent in position D had to decide the distribution scheme in order to 
allocate the surplus of a group different from her own among its members. Table 9 shows both 
the identity of the agent who was in the position D when the moment of the decision arrived and 
the decision s/he took on the distribution of the surplus of the group over which s/he had 
authority.  
First of all, it is worth noting that in each group there was an agent who won most of the 
times; in group 1 three agents won more than once, and one (agent 5) won the power tournament 
7 times; in group 2, two agents prevailed more than once and agent 7 won seven times; in group 
3, there were two agents who won several tournaments (agents 16 won seven times and agent 18 
won four times).  
 
Table 9 
 Sequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
agent D 6 5 4 5 2 2 5 5 5 6 5 5 Group 1’s leader on  
group 2’surplus  decision III I F F F F IV F F II F F 
agent D 7 12 12 7 7 7 7 7 9 8 10 7 Group 2’s leader on  
group 3’surplus  decision F III III IV I III F F F F IV IV 
agent D 18 18 16 16 16 15 16 18 16 16 16 18 Group 3’s leader on  
group 1’surplus  decision F F IV III III IV III F III II III IV 
The distribution schemes (I,II,III,IV)  are presented in table 1, while F is the distribution decided by the 
leader 
 
The profile of winners and losers is summarized in tables 10 and 11. The first table 
suggests that the typical winner is a male (only one woman managed to win more than once) and 
he is selfish (his average offers in the dictator games fell much below the average), and he 
displayed a noteworthy change in his behaviour during the experiment (his average offer in the 
last 20 periods was less than a quarter of the average offer).  
On average women displayed more altruism both unconditional (the female mean 
allocation to another student was 16.9 while the male mean allocation was 9.3) and reciprocative 
(the female mean allocation to charity was 19.3 while the male mean allocation was 10.4) 14. On 
average, women did not display a remarkable change in behaviour when the experiment 
proceeded and the tournament for power started (the female average allocation was less than 15 
% lower in the last 8 sequences than in the first 2, while the male allocation decreased by almost 
80 % in the last sequences). This evidence would suggest a different attitude of females and 
males towards altruism and competition. In both treatments females displayed more altruism and 
they appeared much less involved in the power tournament than males. This result is in line with 
                                                 
14 The presence of a gender effect in dictator games is known (Eckel and Grossman, 
forthcoming). In this framework, the difference is statistically significant in both treatments.  
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some experimental results which, using a completely different framework, suggest that there is a 
different attitude towards competition between males and females and that females are less likely 
than men to choose a competitive situation (Datta Gupta et al. 2005, and Price,2006))   
Moreover, selfish behaviour in the dictator game was often not sufficient to win the power 
tournament. An effectual behaviour in the ultimatum game was rather important as well. Subject 
18, for example, was indisputably a selfish individual, who always gave nothing to the receivers: 
nevertheless he won only four times against the seven times of subject 16 because he offered 
much more than the latter in the ultimatum game, receiving the same number of rejections.  
The important role of behaviour in the ultimatum game is confirmed by table 11 in which 
the profiles of the subjects who never won are reported. Subject 11 is not a model of altruistic 
behavior, nevertheless she never won the tournament since she played the ultimatum game 
senselessly. She offered zero the first four times, always obtaining obvious rejections in replay. In 
the fifth period she offered 10% and was rejected again. Afterward she started to offer too much 
(more than 30%).  
 
Table 10 
Subject 
Times in 
position 
D 
Gender Dictator offers 
First 4 
periods 
Last 20 
periods 
Ultimatum 
offers 
Rejections 
Made (% 
offered) 
Rejections 
received 
5 7 male 1.2 7.1 0.0 28.4 2  1 
7 7 male 6.0 19.4 3.8 16.7 0 3 
16 7 male 2.5 7.7 1.4 18.8 0 3 
18 4 male 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.5 1  3 
2 2 male 4.7 15.7 2.5 39.2 7  1 
6 2 male 4.4 10.5 2.9 26.8 2  1 
12 2 female 10.8 18.6 9.2 27.9 0 4 
Winners average  4.2 11.2 2.8 26.7   
Total average 50% 13.8 17.9 12.9 27.2 2.1 2.1 
   
More generally, the subjects who never won were much more altruistic than the average 
(25 % was the average offer if I exclude subject 11); more interestingly, their behaviour seems 
not to have been affected by the power tournament (one subject did not change her offer in the 
last 20 periods, and two subjects even increased their offers in the second part of the experiment).  
As far as the choice of leaders is concerned, table 9 shows that leaders rather freely 
exercised their authority by determining their own distribution scheme (F in the table) in more 
than the 40% (16 out of 36) of the cases. The distributions chosen were very different, but it is 
evident that on average it emerged a distribution scheme rather equalitarian (on average they gave 
17% to the subject in position D, 14.5% to subjects in position F e 16% to subjects in position A). 
If I take into account the fact that in 20% of the cases leaders chose the perfectly egalitarian 
distribution pattern (IV), I can conclude that the leaders decide most of the times in favor of a 
distribution system which rewards subjects independently of their performance in the tournament 
for power. 
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Table 11 
Subject Times in position D Gender 
Dictator 
offers 
First 4 
periods 
Last 20 
periods 
Ultimatum 
offers 
Rejections 
Made (% 
offered) 
Rejections 
received 
1 0 male 26.9 23.5 27.6 28,2 1  2 
3 0 female 21.4 30,0 19.7 30,5 5  1 
11 0 female 3.8 5 3.6 18,9 0 6 
13 0 female 35.3 36.3 35.1 32,3 0 3 
14 0 female 31,2 23.4 32.8 26,7 4  3 
17 0 female 10.9 11,3 10.8 22,9 0 3 
Losers average 
(excluded sub. 11)  
21.6 
(25.0) 
21.6 
(24.9) 
21.6 
(25.2) 
26.6  
(28.1)   
Total average 50% 13.8 17.9 12.9 27.2 2.1 2.1 
Altruism and prior beliefs 
Soon before the onset of the experiment, experimental subjects were requested to answer 
some questions in order to provide a simple view of their prior beliefs and their values on some 
issues related to the distributional content of the experiment. In this section I analyze the 
relationship between the answers to the questionnaire and the behaviour of subjects.  
This brief attitudinal survey was not meant to provide a detailed and complete 
psychological and sociological profile of the subjects, both because it was not the prime aim of 
the research, and because administration of a far-reaching and therefore long questionnaire would 
have excessively lengthened the experiment’s duration, with a likely negative effect on the 
quality of the experimental data?. 
The questionnaire that I administered to the subjects is summarized in table 12. There 
were questions related to objective characteristics of agents (gender, age, number of 
brothers/sisters), questions related to the subjective degree of satisfaction with their family 
income or their life experience (income, satisfaction) and other questions meant to investigate the 
subjects’ attitudes and values on issues such as the trustworthiness of strangers (trust), 
materialism (money), and the cause of poverty (poor); lastly there was a question on the political 
position of subjects (policy).    
 
 Table 12  
Variable name Question Answer 
Gender Sex? 0 male 1 female 
Age How old are you?  
Siblings How many brothers/sisters do you have?  
Income How do you judge your family income? 1- very low -,  7 - very high 
politics   As far as your political opinion is concerned, where would you locate yourself on the political spectrum? 
1 - very much on the right, 7 - very 
much on the left 
satisfaction Thinking of your current experience, to what extent do you feel satisfied with your life? 
1 - very unsatisfied, 7 - very 
satisfied  
How much do you agree with the following sentences  
Money In life, being economically and financially well-off  is the most important thing 1 - fully agree, 7 - fully disagree 
Trust In relationships with strangers, is strongly recommended to pay attention before trusting them 1 - fully agree, 7 - fully disagree 
Poor If a person is poor, this is often the result of a lack of effort on their part 1 - fully agree, 7 - fully disagree 
 
Table 13 summarizes the average results for all the subjects and for the two treatments. 
The average experimental subject judges his/her family income as sufficiently good, is 
moderately leftist on political issues, and does not consider economic well-being as the major 
goal of his/her life. Moreover, s/he is rather satisfied with life, does not trust strangers but does 
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not believe that the responsibility for poverty lies with the poor themselves.  The samples in the 
two treatments are in some cases moderately different.  
 
  Table 13   
Variable name Total average Control  Power  Male Female 
gender 55% of male 55 % of male 55 % of male  
age 22.2 22.3 22.0 22.2 22.3 
siblings 1.2 1.4 1 1.3 1.1 
income 3.7 3.4 4.1 3.6 3.9 
politics 4.5 4.2 4.8 4.5 4.5 
money 3.0 3.6 2.4 3.6 2.8 
satisfaction 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.2 
trust 5.8 5.3 6.2 5.4 6.3 
poor 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.3 
 
The regressions results are shown in table 14. Not all the agents’ characteristics and 
opinions are related to their choices in the dictator game. However, these results give us 
interesting insights and provide indirect but robust support for the outcome discussed in the 
previous sections. First of all, it appears evident that the donations to charity organization and to 
subjects are caused by different motivations, confirming that donations capture two different 
motivations for altruism. In the offers to subjects, almost none of the variables are strongly 
significant (also the F test is scarcely significant), which supports the intuition that unconditional 
altruism is explained by other determinants, for example inequality aversion, which were not 
considered by the questionnaire  
The most relevant regressor is the variable ‘power’; this is a dummy variable which is set 
to one in the power treatment. It confirms that the behaviour of subjects is significantly different 
in the two settings, even after having controlled for the agents’ characteristics as scanned by the 
questionnaire. A significant gender effect is present: women offered significantly more than men 
whatever their values.  
The variables income, money and poor appear to be statistically significant. The first 
seems to suggest that altruism is seen as a superior good, demand for which tends to increase with 
the subject’s income. Another explanation for this result is possible: if the agents had a preference 
for equality (or an aversion to inequality), it would more likely that they decided to donate both to 
charity or to other subjects when they appreciated their family income and judged it well in 
relative terms15. As regards the variable ‘money’, it is quite obvious that the sum of money that 
donors decide to give would depend on the opportunity cost of donation. The question asked can 
be seen as an indirect evaluation of the preference for money, and then on the cost of a donation. 
Indirect support for the idea that one motivation for dictator offers was conditional altruism is the 
significance of the variable poor. The higher the degree of agreement with the statement “If a 
person is poor, this is often the result of a lack of effort on their part “ the lower the percentage of 
the sum that subjects leave to the receiver in the dictator game.  
 
 Table 12   
 All dictator offers Offers to Charity Offers to Subjects 
 Coefficients t statistics Coefficients t statistics Coefficients t statistics Coefficients t statistics 
(Constant) 29,187 1,062 17,648 2,494 15,555 1,737 21,808 2,149 
gender 7,864 2,450 7,885 2,754 9,530 2,630 4,652 1,133 
income 2,129 1,452 2,573 1,936 3,432 2,040 ,857 0,449 
money -3,070 -2,280 -3,847 -3,672 -4,647 -3,504 -2,270 -1,511 
                                                 
15 Recall that the question was not about the absolute level of income but the subjective 
evaluation of the family income. 
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poor -2,581 -2,409 -2,699 -2,682 -2,676 -2,101 -2,734 -1,894 
power -11,472 -3,051 -11,278 -3,470 -12,623 -3,069 -8,604 -1,846 
age -0,591 -0,629       
brother -0,941 -,474       
politics 1,349 1,251       
trust 0,040 0,034       
satisfaction -0,831 -0,436       
R2 0,624 0,596 0,554 0,267 
F 4,152 8,856 7.443 2,181 
         
 
Concluding remarks  
The paper has analyzed the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental 
framework. I observed the behavior of 36 experimental agents, undergraduate students at the 
University of Siena, as they played a series of dictator and ultimatum games in two experimental 
settings which differed according to how the group’s surplus was distributed among its members. 
In the control setting (treatment A) the group surplus was distributed equally among members, 
while in the power setting (treatment B) there was a ranking of earnings in the group and the 
subject who had earned the larger sum was responsible for deciding the distribution scheme of 
the surplus in a group different from his/her own.  
The results are quite interesting: introduction into the experimental structure of a 
tournament for the power to decide the allocation of the group surplus appreciably altered the 
behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, 
significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for a chance to gain power. 
The results are more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of 
the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. 
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